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 Abstract 
This paper examines the environmental and socio-economic consequences of hydraulic infrastructural 
changes along the Senegal River valley and estuary. During the 1980s, two dams were built along the 
valley floor to facilitate hydro-electrical production and regular water supply for crop irrigation. In 2003, 
a breach was dug across Barbary Spit to alleviate flooding in the nearby Saint-Louis city. Although these 
structures helped regulate the river flow, they also resulted in a series of unforeseen impacts. The study 
examines these, after on-site measurements (topometry, water salinity, piezometry), analysis of 
hydrological data, field observations, and surveys with dam managers, state regional directions and local 
stakeholders. It stresses the urgency of elaborating models of hydraulic management to limit the negative 
consequences of the hydraulic constructions. These models should consider the variety of water uses in 
the middle valley and delta, and also the water safety and quality (salinity) downriver from Diama Dam. 
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Introduction 
Since the late 1980s, the Senegal River valley, located in Mali, Senegal and Mauritania has 
progressively become more artificially engineered with the building of embankments, free-flow 
canals, irrigation ditches and sluicegates. These hydraulic structures were developed in direct 
connection with the construction of two larger structures, the Manantali dam, located upriver in 
Mali, and the Diama dam, located near the mouth of the river in Senegal (see Fig.1). The two 
dams originally had clearly distinct, but complementary roles. The Diama dam was primarily 
designed to block sea water intrusion within the valley and has a limited (0.25 km3) stocking 
capacity. However, because of ever-increasing farming and agro-industrial demands, the dam’s 
primary function was shifted to that of a reservoir dam. The Manantali dam, on the other hand, 
was designed to control river flow and has a larger hydraulic capacity of approximately 12 km3. 
Prior to the construction of the dam, the surrounding natural environment precluded sustainable 
development as inter-annual climatic conditions were highly variable (Michel 1973; Belloncle 
1985; Boutillier and Schmitz 1987), with great disparities in rainfall, magnitude, and duration of 
floods. Furthermore, soils were exposed to increasing salinity as the saltwater table intruded into 
the delta and the saline undercurrent flowed upriver. The flat terrain and the need to build 
complex, costly infrastructure for flood protection, irrigation and drainage made water 
management difficult.  
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Fig. 1. The Senegal river basin and its new mouth. 
 
Dams and sluicegates enable regulation of the water flow of rivers, and water management 
depends extensively on human decisions. Here, the management priorities for the two dams were 
predominantly geared towards the development of irrigated crops in the former flood plains and 
electricity production at Manantali. Accordingly, river authorities tended to maintain high water 
levels in the Manantali reservoir as long as possible. This was not compatible with a 
management scheme aimed at controlling floods down river from Diama. Thus, because the 
Manantali dam can control only part of the river basin, Saint-Louis city was flooded in 
September 2003. This could not be prevented or controlled by the dams. Furthermore, the effects 
of the first flood were amplified when a second flood wave was observed upriver (at Bakel) at 
the same time and was expected to reach the city twenty days later. Saint-Louis is located 
approximately 30 km from the river mouth and is separated from the ocean by a long coastal spit 
(the Barbary Spit). In order to enable the draining of the river waters and shorten the distance 
between the town and the river mouth, an artificial opening in the Barbary Spit was dug as an 
emergency response, seven km down river from Saint-Louis. The result was an immediate 
reduction in the flood.  
Control of the river discharge via the dams and embankments, and, more recently, the opening of 
the Barbary Breach downriver, have led to drastic changes in the river flow and abrupt 
modifications of the originally amphibian environment. This led to unforeseen environmental 
impacts, most of which appear to have arisen from the initial uncertainties regarding the mid- 
and long-term consequences of the hydraulic infrastructure and its management: the unexpected 
occurs and these new constraints require frequent adjustments in the water management. Such a 
reactive process leads to a reduced efficiency when facing extreme hydrological events. 
Consequently, the uncertainties and limitations imposed by the hydraulic infrastructure and the 
Barbary Breach impact water control managers and the local populations living in the lower part 
of the Delta. 
Over two decades after the first water management efforts in the Senegal River valley, it is 
possible to appraise the consequences. We first compare the economic objectives, as proclaimed 
by the Office de Mise en valeur de la Vallée du Sénégal, (OMVS Senegal River Development 
Agency) at the time the dams were as constructed, with the observed results. Then we address 
the issue of the unforeseen environmental impacts brought about by the artificial transformation 
of the valley. Finally, we will show that the opening of the breach to protect Saint-Louis from the 
floods in 2003 was a short-term solution and that more recent complications have arisen.  
Conceptual Framework 
The social-ecological systems (SESs) of the Delta and along the Senegal River valley have long 
rested on very subtle adaptations to annual variations of rainfall and river flow/drainage. The 
hydraulic infrastructure, i.e., the two dams [Manantali: 11.3 km3 for a surface of 475 km² at a 
water level of 208 m; Diama, 0.25 km3 for a surface of 235 km² at a water level of 1.5 m], a 
number of embankments, and more recently, the artificial breaching of Barbary Spit, have 
greatly modified the hydrological conditions in the middle delta and estuary. This has led to a 
major reorganization of the SESs. The concepts of robustness and resilience are often used to 
describe and understand the changes in SESs integrated in highly uncertain environments 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002; Berkes et al. 2003; Anderies et al. 2004; Janssen et al. 2007). The 
notion of resilience appears particularly relevant to the framework of the present study. 
Resilience has been defined as a system’s capacity to sustain shocks, to adapt to changes, and to 
persist, often at the expense of some alterations in its constitutive components (Holling, 1973; 
Holling 1978). Beyond given thresholds, SESs shift into a different regimen involving structural 
modifications (Holling, 1978; Walker et al. 2006; Janssen et al. 2007); these regimens are termed 
“alternative regimen”. In the Senegal River delta and estuary, the whole system has undergone 
just such a regimen shift (Scheffer et al. 2001; Carpenter 2003; Walker et al. 2006), that seems 
irreversible in the medium term. The alternative regimens may be of benefit to some 
stakeholders; however, they have unwanted or mixed effects for others. Within the emerging 
alternative systems, the unwanted effects, e.g., Typha australis proliferation, increasing salinity 
of the water, and water tables located near the river, or increased tidal range in the estuary, are of 
greatest concern as they are often resilient.  
The hydraulic infra-structure adjustments were achieved under the pretext of more efficient use 
of water resources and enhanced control over uncertainties (Gunderson 1999; Gunderson and 
Holling 2002; Walker et al. 2003; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007). Uncertainty can be defined as events 
that are not fixed or determined, and by extension, as worries about an unknown future. Often 
associated with anxiety, uncertainty has always been an inherent factor in the lives of those who 
live in the Sahel region, due to rainfall variability affecting crop-growing and pastoral resources. 
Such uncertainty depends on different parameters (e.g., the date at which effective rain begins to 
fall, the occurrence, duration and intensity of dry periods during the rainy season, etc.), and is 
part of a definite, seasonal timeframe. Uncertainty is thus perceived as normal, expected, and 
understood within these communities. As such, over time it has shaped the adaptive strategies of 
the SESs, enabling them to attenuate the climatic risks. Also expected, but less well understood, 
is the uncertainty experienced by those who rely on the river for their water supply, when the 
latter is dependent on climatic conditions higher up in the catchments. Furthermore, the climatic 
uncertainty may involve greater or lesser constraints. For instance, a severe drought lasting 
several years is difficult to endure and may no longer seem acceptable to the stakeholders today, 
as technological solutions may be available. Societies depending on technology are therefore 
tempted to solve such recurrent problems with solutions such as dams. This was the case in the 
Senegal River basin with the building of the Diama and Manantali dams, in 1985 and 1988 
respectively, after 20 long years of drought (see Fig. 1).  
New environmental disturbances are however emerging, for which no measures of compensation 
or attenuation had been planned, financially or otherwise. Thus, the nature of uncertainties has 
changed and humans no longer seem to be able to manage them, although they will eventually 
adjust in the course of time. Many of the uncertainties discussed below stem from flaws found in 
the impact studies (Gannett, Fleming, Corddry, and Carpenter Inc. 1978, 1980; Euroconsult and 
Sir Alexander Gibb Inc., 1990), which either did not document the difficulties likely to arise after 
such radical landscape transformation (Engelhard 1991; Kane, 1997; Blanchon 2003; Leroy 
2006), or whose purpose was not to devise compensatory measures. Although the benefits 
derived from a dam can only be assessed in the long term, the period of adaptation and 
uncertainty is a difficult one for local inhabitants, and needs to be anticipated, and attended to, to 
as great a degree as possible. 
Methods and History of the Case Study 
The first approach is an assessment of the consequences of area planning, based on a comparison 
between the initial objectives and the present situation. The second approach aims to describe the 
impacts of the development, especially those impacts that went unmentioned or were not 
anticipated during initial planning stages. Incomplete objectives and unexpected impacts lead to 
disappointment and require rectification, at best, or compensation. Compensatory measures, 
however, are always undertaken in retrospect and are often designed as a response to a crisis or 
implemented by trial and error, and in themselves can create unforeseen problems. Both our 
approaches involved a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the current situation. 
Specifically, we made field observations and interviews,as well as on-site measurements 
(topometry, water salinity, and piezometry for the level of the water tables). Our fieldwork was 
supplemented by an analysis of existing data from the hydroclimatic database (Institut de 
Recherche pour le Développement, 2008).  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the whole of West Africa was affected by drought, as shown by the 
graphs of ten-year mean isohyets (equal rainfalls contour lines,  (Puech 1983; Albergel et al. 
1984; Venema et al. 1997); with the 800 mm isohyet moving southwards by nearly two degrees 
of latitude along certain meridians. In the Sudanese Sahel, the flow of the Senegal River was 
reduced significantly; at Bakel the annual mean flow dropped by an average of 75% between 
1970 and 1990, and by 50% during the 1980s (Mahé and Olivry 1995). Because of growing 
official concern and increasing international awareness, the OMVS, a tripartite authority (Mali, 
Mauritania, Senegal), was established in March 1972, with the major objective of improving the 
three member countries’ food supply by creating 375,000 ha (hectares) of irrigated land for rice 
cultivation: 240,000 ha in Senegal, 126,000 ha in Mauritania and 9,000 ha in Mali. The annual 
yield of the hydro-agricultural schemes was forecast to be 12 tons per hectare, in addition to a 
farming-sector growth rate of 10% per annum (Leroy 2006). Two dams were built to achieve 
these aims (see Fig. 1): Diama for preventing intrusion of sea water upstream, Manantali for 
supplying irrigated farmland with water and the three countries’ fast-growing capitals with 
electricity. The dam’s hydroelectric power station has a generating capacity of 800 GwH a year. 
Finally, because releases of water from Manantali dam were expected to keep the river’s water 
level high enough during the dry season, year-round boat traffic, running from Saint-Louis to 
Kayes in Mali was been planned. Two decades later, the outcomes of three important domains: 
navigation, irrigation and hydroelectric power production, can be assessed.  
Regarding navigation, as could be expected, there has been no improvement in the Senegal 
River’s navigability to Kayes in Mali. Large financial investments would have been necessary to 
upgrade the riverbed morphology, and this was unlikely because trade between Mali and the 
ocean does not transit through Saint-Louis, the city having no proper port facilities.  
Irrigated agriculture, presently covering 125,000 ha of large plots, is developing much slower 
than initially planned. Only one-third of the areas equipped for irrigation are currently cultivated 
(Bader et al. 2003). On individual plots, crop yields rapidly dropped to an average of four tons 
per hectare after three years of cultivation (Ceuppens and Woperei 1999). This poor outcome is 
due to several factors, in particular hydraulic (de Montgolfier 1996). Specifically, crop- growing 
soils remain fragile due to salinisation. Protection against salinity requires a well-designed 
drainage network. In practice, the area’s drainage is often badly designed, poorly maintained, or 
simply non-existent, resulting in increasing salinity of areas that eventually have to be 
abandoned. In addition, waste water carrying pesticides and weed-killers are not properly 
disposed of (Mietton et al. 1991; Humbert et al. 1995). Although a canal to evacuate waste water 
was planned in the impact studies (UNEP/UCC-WATER/SGPRE 2002), it was never budgeted 
for and, as of November 2008 remains incomplete. Drainage techniques are poor, and it is 
difficult to get rice fields perfectly level (Pesneaud 1996; Leroy 2006). Finally, the fields are too 
large for the insufficiently mechanized farming techniques in use.  
The objectives for hydroelectric power production were met by 2002. The three national capitals 
now have reliable power supplies, and both living conditions and production environment have 
greatly improved. Power production, however, is now subjected to new constraints. The 
Manantali’s water reserve is not only used to generate hydroelectric power, but also to 
compensate for inadequate flooding of fields or low river flow, and also allows for some post-
flood as well as irrigated crop-growing (Bader et al. 2003). The advantages and potentials of 
flood regression agriculture (Acreman et al. 2000; Acreman 2001), whose yields are low (about 1 
ton/ha/year), had clearly been under-estimated. Although expected to be only temporary, this 
practice has turned out to be essential for the communities of the lower-middle valley. 
Eventually, the objectives assigned to the Manantali dam may end in a conflicting situation in the 
course of time, due to the competing needs of water storage for electricity production and water 
releases for flood regression agriculture (Acreman et al. 2000; Acreman 2001). 
Thus, because of contradictory objectives and rapid, imperfect adaptations, the era of uncertainty 
is not yet over for the local communities. Nevertheless, on the Mauritanian side of the river at 
least, improving water management skills have begun to bear fruit, with uptrend in biodiversity 
and economic production (Duvail 2001; Duvail et al. 2001). Unfortunately, the artificial 
breaching of the Barbary Spit in late 2003 compounded the situation. The level of the Senegal 
River at Diama had steadily risen throughout September 2003 leading to the flooding of Saint-
Louis. The flood alert threshold of 1.20 m (UNEP/UCC-WATER/SGPRE 2002) was observed 
by mid-September. A maximum height of 1.42 m above the reference level was reached on 
September 28th, and remained at 1.41 m over the following days. Given the flows recorded 
upstream at Bakel, the river was forecast to keep rising significantly over the following days. 
Indeed, a maximum flow rate of 3505 m3/s was recorded at Bakel (see Fig. 1) on the 23rd of 
September. The rise of the water level clearly demonstrated that the drainage basin, downriver 
from Bakel, was not regulated by the Manantali Dam; the inflows from the Falémé and Baoulé 
rivers, as well as the severe Sahelian floods (Térékollé, Kolimbiné, Lake Magui) were not 
controlled. In addition, because of the hydroelectrical management of the dam since the end of 
2002, the Manantali reservoir was full and could no longer limit potential floods caused by 
storms at the end of the rainy season. Downriver, Diama suffered from uncontrolled flooding, 
which can take approximately 20 days to arrive from Bakel. Faced with concerns expressed by 
the Saint-Louis inhabitants and perhaps under pressure from the authorities, the basin managers 
decided to open a breach across the narrow coastal spit, to bring about a reduction in the slope of 
water surface. It should be noted that this flood-protection measure had been mentioned in an 
earlier UNEP/UCC-WATER/SGPRE report in October 2002, in conjunction with additional 
measures, such as the construction of protective breakwaters, next to the breach. During the night 
of October 3rd, a 4 m-wide channel was dug (see Fig. 2); the height of the river, as measured at 
the Faidherbe Bridge, dropped dramatically over the following 48 hours and by approximately a 
meter in 10 days. However, the breach widened rapidly (Kane et al. 2003), reaching 400 m in a 
few weeks, and continued opening at a steady rate of about a meter a day. In April 2006, the 
breach was 1.4 km wide. (see Fig. 2). Since then, the opening seems to have remained stable. 
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Fig. 2. Time-space evolution of the new river mouth between October 2003 and April 2006 (data 
from N. Guiguen and co-authors) 
 
 
Key findings 
The building of the hydraulic structures (the dams, free-flow canals, embankments, sluicegates 
and irrigation ditches) in the valley since the 1980s and, more recently, the artificial breaching of 
Barbary Spit in 2003, have contributed to the emergence of new, ecological and socio-economic 
difficulties. These difficulties are complex and often integrated. The major impacts, and those 
with the most durable consequences, probably occur in the socio-economic domain, as for 
example the out-migration of communities from the Gandiolais’ area (see Fig. 1). However, the 
impacts caused by the hydraulic development differ in both form and time between the estuary 
and the middle delta, upriver from Diama. Like all dams, Diama has created a boundary. Being 
an anti-salt barrier, Diama divides the upriver and downriver areas into two highly distinct 
hydrographical sectors with regards to water quality (Barusseau et al. 1998). Within the estuary, 
it is still too early for a proper assessment of the impact of the artificial opening of Barbary Spit 
to be undertaken. The remedy chosen to deal with flood risks at Saint-Louis may nevertheless 
prove to be worse than the original affliction, at least in the section downriver from Diama, 
where the water table salinity has much increased. 
The Middle Delta 
Originally designed as a barrier against salt intrusion, the Diama dam has gradually been 
assigned an extra function as a reservoir: the average water level of 1.50 m in 1992 rose to 1.75 
m in 1995, 1.90 m in 1997, 2.0 m in 1999 and has been 2.10 m since 2002. This is an instance 
where hydraulic engineers are being asked to respond to the persistent farming and agro-
industrial demands by maintaining high water levels to ensure gravitational irrigation of the 
farmland (Duvail 2001).  
The changes in the hydrological factors (reduction in salt water intrusion, stability of water levels 
and increased irrigation potential) appear to have contributed to the emergence of new health 
problems such as bilharziosis and malaria. For instance, Handschumacher (Philippe et al. 1998) 
explains how the epidemic of intestinal bilharziosis in the town of Richard Toll (Senegal, see 
Fig. 1), found outside of the usual distribution of Schistosoma mansoni in West Africa, was able 
to gain hold in a new ecological environment. This was due to the existence of permanent fresh 
water, the regulation of the levels of Lake Guiers, and the presence of water canals supplying the 
nearby sugarcane fields. This link, however, has not been proven, and must be considered with 
caution. “The relationship between the presence of intermediate hosts or vectors and a specific 
disease (e.g, bilharziosis, malaria) is neither immediate nor inevitable. In the same way, there is 
no obvious link between irrigated areas and the appearance of intermediate hosts and vectors,” 
(Philippe et al. 1998, p. 398). Indeed, the transmission cycle of the vector can only be completed 
by infestation of intermediate hosts, and this can only occur through diseased people arriving 
from a zone where the disease is endemic. Richard Toll is a plantation town that has attracted a 
large labor force, some of it arriving from the south of the country where bilharziosis is endemic. 
The Diama anti-salt dam cannot, therefore, be implicated in the spread of the disease. The 
influence is an indirect one, as the increased availability of water for irrigation has favored the 
extension of sugar-producing areas and the expansion of the work force. 
A major difficulty stressed by all stakeholders has been the increase in the number of invader 
aquatic species, linked to the permanent presence of fresh water upriver from Diama. Although 
the proliferation of plants such as Salvinia molesta and Pistia stratiotes are now under control 
based on our field observations; others such as Typha australis are becoming an increasing 
concern. Biological methods of control are not yet effective, while removal by mechanical means 
requires considerable physical and financial efforts and only yields a short-term benefit. This 
type of infestation has seriously impaired access to, and movement around, waterways, 
especially for fishermen. Canal and tributary flow has become sluggish and sedimentation is 
increasing (Philippe et al. 1998). This has resulted in sheltering and nesting possibilities for 
animal species, such as the grain-eating bird Quelea quelea, which feeds on cultivated land. 
The North bank of the river is characterized by a mosaic of landscapes in which rice plots do not 
yet occupy the whole space and traditional activities such as fishing, livestock breeding, and 
gathering still persist near the protected ecosystems of the Diawling Park (PND), a protected area 
created and supported by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). It has now 
become feasible to generate floods during the dry season through the sluicegates located on the 
north bank embankment. However, this artificial flooding is likely to give rise to conflicts 
between local stakeholders (fishermen, stock-breeders, etc.). This is why a time frame had been 
agreed upon between these groups and park managers regarding the flooding of the basins during 
the dry season (Duvail et al. 2001; Duvail and Hamerlynck 2003; Hamerlynck et al. 2005). Yet, 
between 2002 and 2006, the basins were dried out in spite of the agreement in order to limit 
Typha propagation. Everybody was satisfied – except the stockbreeders who need a short counter 
season flood after the dry season for their herds (camels, bovines, sheep, goats). It is likely that 
the lack of respect or adherence to the implemented management plan will provoke a long lasting 
discontentment on the part of stockbreeders.  
The economic and financial feasibility of developing a new industry to promote the use of Typha 
australis (for fuel, methane production, wickerwork, building material, and animal fodder) 
became moot. In addition to creating a large number of jobs, it would most likely be the best way 
to control the spread of Typha (Theuerkorn and Henning 2005). 
The Estuary 
In October 2003, when the city of Saint-Louis was flooded, an artificial canal was dug across 
Barbary Spit, as explained above. This had positive effects as the flood of Saint–Louis receded 
immediately. However, the artificial breach has also had negative effects, such as a massive 
penetration of sea water into the lower estuary and a greater daily fluctuation in water levels.  
With respect to the beneficial effects, in the two years following the digging of the breach, the 
water level at Saint-Louis has not exceeded 50 cm, although the outflow volumes from the 
Diama dam did not change compared to the previous years. The radical change in the slope of 
the water line (a more than twofold increase) suggests that Saint-Louis flood risk has been 
alleviated. Nevertheless, to improve safety and reduce the amount of water released during the 
high water level period, the coordinated management of the two dams, however complex it may 
be in the Manantali-Diama stretch, should take into account the downriver section between 
Diama and the new river mouth.  
The opening of the breach has also led to two negative effects: an increase in the tidal range and 
an increase in the salinity level throughout the estuary. The increase in tidal range has been the 
most obvious and the least questionable effect of the changes to the mouth of the river. 
Modifications in semi-diurnal tide patterns can be seen in a number of ways (). Firstly, the daily 
maximum tidal range, as measured downriver from Diama, has increased by a factor of three, 
from a 2001-2002 average of 0.30 m to an average of 0.93 m in 2004-2005. Furthermore, since 
2004, the tidal range can be seen year-round, including during the rainy season, which was not 
previously the case. Finally, the amplitude of the 14-day spring-tide cycle has been reinforced. 
At Diama, the amplitude between spring-tide and its accompanying neap-tide has more than 
doubled. From a geotechnical standpoint, such a tidal range can have undermining and/or 
gouging effects on the wharves of Saint-Louis, the piers of Faidherbe Bridge, and the 
foundations of the Diama Dam. It was in this context that a new study of the dissipation energy 
downriver from Diama was ordered by the dam managers. Management of the Diama Dam 
should take into account both the dam’s own mechanical stability and its new function as a 
reservoir, which had not originally been planned. With regard to the first point, until recently, 
dissipation energy had been strictly limited to 1000 m4 /s (for instance, 1000 m3 /s under a one-
meter drop between upstream and downstream : 1000 m3/s x 1m = 1000 m4/s) by the regulations 
governing the management of the dam (Coyne and Bellier Inc. and SOGREAH Inc. 1987). 
Today, the increase in tidal range has led to a water fall which exceeds one m, and has therefore 
forced the Diama Dam’s managers to restrict the volume of water released. However, a recent 
engineering study (J.-P. Lamagat, director of research IRD, and N. Guiguen, engineer IRD, 
February 2006, pers. Comm.) and new computations state that the dissipation energy could reach 
15,000 m4/s without threatening the dam’s stability. This fifteen-fold increase may come as a 
surprise, particularly when one remembers the worries regarding the dam that were expressed in 
2004 and 2005. 
The salinity level appears to be increasing in the estuary under the influence of two opposing 
factors: a more hydrodynamically-efficient intrusion of sea water up to Diama; and, since late 
2002, the discharging of fresh water at Diama. The latter has never dropped below 100 - 200 
m3/s and is equivalent to the amount forced through the turbines at Manantali during the dry 
season. The situation has changed from that of the late 1980s and 1990s. At that time, the dam 
would be closed for extended periods resulting in an excessive buildup of salt in the estuary (for 
instance, salt content reached 35.9 g/l at Saint-Louis in May 1992, a level similar to sea water 
salinity (Cecchi 1992)) and in the noticeable retreat of mangrove ecosystems. Although surface 
salinity varies over space and time, it did not exceed 20 g/l, in December 2004, May 2005 and 
February 2006, despite low discharge rates from Diama. However, the downriver section of the 
river, between the new and old mouth, is now filled in. This section is near the ocean and is 
turning into a lagoon and will most likely have a very high salt content due to the lack of a 
“flushing” effect. The flow of seawater into this area might be a threat to cropping, forestry and 
pastoral activities and to fresh-water supplies needed for the market-gardening economy of the 
Gandiolais district (Diallo 2005). The thin layer of fresh water overlying the saltwater table in 
the lower delta’s sand-dune area had enabled the Gandiolais, downriver from Saint-Louis, to 
become an economically dynamic zone. The freshwater table had started to fall in the 1970s, due 
to drought, then due to development works on the river, and finally to the disappearance of 
natural flooding. This drop in the water supply encouraged the planting of onions, a new crop 
requiring less water, in place of other traditional vegetables (Bonnardel 1992). This thin layer of 
fresh water is threatened since the Barbary Spit breach was opened. The resulting amplification 
of the tidal range and salt water intrusion has led to an increased contamination of the water 
table. Salinity can reach 2.9 g/l on plots located near the river, a level considered too high for 
crop production; consequently plots closer to the river have been abandoned in the last year or 
two, with well water having a salt content of 12.5 g/l. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The transformation of the Senegal River Valley, planned in the 1970s and carried out in the late 
1980s, implicitly presupposed the successful change from a seasonal economy of hunting and 
gathering and extensive agriculture to one consisting of intensive, permanent agriculture, whose 
profitability was overestimated from the outset (Engelhard 1991; Duvail 2001).Initial objectives 
for crop yields and irrigated areas have fallen short. Extensive restoration works in the 
transformed areas are necessary in the short term, and will prove costly for farmers’ 
organizations. Indeed, since the withdrawal of the National Society for the Development and 
Operation of the Senegal River, (SAED, Société nationale d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation du 
Delta et de la vallée du fleuve Sénégal) in 1987, the cost of restoration work is incumbent upon 
the farmers (Boutillier, 1989; Leroy 2006); financial assistance is not available. A final 
restoration was performed by SAED before turning the land over to the farmers’ organization. 
Since then, farmers can only level the land every three to five years because of the high cost of 
the mechanized operation (Boutillier 1989).  
Rice growing has turned out to have high social and ecological costs. The decision to create ex 
nihilo a rice growing sector dependent on irrigation was a political and macroeconomic decision. 
It was reinforced by the possibility of developing the hitherto sparsely populated area into a 
fertile wetland through the supply of gravity-fed irrigation water at a very low cost. Currently, 
the situation is economically, environmentally, and institutionally deadlocked. Confronted with 
so many obstacles and setbacks, the future of the chosen approach seems open to question 
(Pesneaud 1996). Over the past two decades, stakeholders have had to adapt, first to the delayed 
building of an embankment along the north bank, and then to frequent, unpredictable, 
modifications in the management of the Diama and Manantali Dams. This raises the question of 
whether a more detailed impact assessment should be carried out prior to the construction of 
such large dams.  
With respect to the lower river course, the hydraulic infrastructure and dam management have 
had mixed effects on the flooding of the city of Saint-Louis. Flood intensity is not only related to 
the maximum height reached by the river, but also to the duration of the flood, local rainfall and 
effectiveness of embankments. The 2003 flood, although a major one, was not exceptional: the 
maximum water level recorded at Saint-Louis was 142 cm, much lower than in 1999 (164.5 cm) 
or 1950 (179 cm) (Laperrière and Luchetta 2003). The intensity of the 2003 flood is likely to 
have been aggravated by the impediment of the flow downriver due to the partial blocking of the 
old river mouth, which had been dredged regularly up to the 1960s. It can nevertheless be 
hypothesized that it is not so much the hydrological conditions that have changed, as Saint-
Louis’s own self –induced vulnerability due to the expansion of housing developments, 
particularly in the low-lying part of the town. This may be due to several factors: overconfidence 
during flood-free years aggravated by poor urban planning; widespread excessive cost of land; 
lack of space for new housing areas forcing marginalized people to set in inappropriate sites; as 
well as limited urban planning. The building of the dams may have led to the belief that there 
was no longer any danger of flooding. In the future, to limit flood risks in the city, the joint 
management of the two dams should take into account safety concerns downstream from Diama. 
It appears necessary to start drawing up a new management model for the dams, taking into 
consideration both the concerns of the city of Saint-Louis and the morphological evolution of the 
new river mouth. 
In today’s Senegal River Delta, environmental uncertainty is being experienced in a number of 
ways: ecological, socio-economic, and sanitary. The common concern is the uncertain control of 
the quantity and quality of water resources (fresh, brackish, and sometimes waste water). The 
monitoring of ecological parameters and socioeconomic indicators is urgently required, as is the 
hydraulic modeling of the section of the river between Diama and the ocean. Hydraulic modeling 
should be carried out in conjunction with a digital landscape model of the flood plain, something 
that does not yet exist. 
To conclude, we would stress the need for a more efficient management model that would 
encompass the two dams and integrate the Diama-Ocean stretch. This hydraulic model should 
consider a way to regulate extreme flows by ensuring a minimum flow for alleviating the over-
salinisation risk in the estuary on the one hand, and a maximum flow level that should not be 
exceeded for Saint-Louis flood security on the other. Moreover, this complex model must take 
into account the known variations of tidal ranges. This integration of both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of the river’s characteristics would enable one to develop a cohesive, 
comprehensive, and ‘workable’ approach. A participatory process, to be initiated by city 
planners and dam managers, is likely to achieve this aim and help reducing uncertainties linked 
to large dam projects. 
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